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One who would defend [certain constitutional rights] must share his foxhole
with scoundrels of every sort, but to abandon the post because of the poor
1
company is to sell freedom cheaply.

I. Introduction
My initial reaction to Brett Shockley’s Note, Protecting Due Process from
the PROTECT Act: The Problems with Increasing Periods of Supervised
Release for Sexual Offenders,2 was to admire his courage. Not many people
would undertake a discussion of possible injustice to child pornographers, who
surely rank with terrorists and drug dealers as the most reviled and least
sympathetic claimants for fair treatment. Shockley puts aside the moral
condemnation these people deserve,3 and focuses on the morality of
procedure—the rule of law if you will—divorced from the worthiness, or lack
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379–80 (4th Cir. 1993).
2. Brett M. Shockley, Protecting Due Process from the PROTECT Act: The Problems
with Increasing Periods of Supervised Release for Sexual Offenders, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
353 (2010).
3. See id. at 388 (acknowledging that sex offenders deserve punishment).
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thereof, of particular defendants. As students of criminal procedure come to
learn, our most precious rights are sometimes invoked and defended by our
worst citizens.4 In the final tally, constitutional protections often flow from the
intrinsic worth of proper procedure, aside from the worth of the people who ask
for that procedure.
The other display of courage that gained my admiration was the
willingness of a second-year law student to tackle two complex constitutional
doctrines,5 further complicated by seemingly inconsistent congressional
enactments. When I grasped the full scope of Shockley’s analysis, I mused as
to why he had not tackled something easier like the abortion controversy or the
full ramifications of death penalty law. If this "first edition" article by a young
scholar is a predictor of the future, I can hardly wait for the sequel.
II. The Constitutionality of Current Law
Shockley attempts to hook the government on the horns of a dilemma
created by two constitutional doctrines: the double jeopardy provisions of the
Fifth Amendment,6 and the Due Process Clause as expounded in Apprendi v.
New Jersey.7 At its most fundamental level, the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits multiple trials and multiple punishments for a single crime. When a
convicted sex offender commits a second sexual offense, the simplest way to
avoid double jeopardy problems is to say that the offender will be punished
separately for two distinct crimes. Separate crimes and punishments could be
the following: (1) the first offense warrants ten years imprisonment with the
accompanying lifetime supervised release; and (2) the second offense warrants
revocation of that supervised release and reincarceration for life.8
4. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged
in controversies involving not very nice people.").
5. The Supreme Court referred to one of those doctrines—the prohibition against double
jeopardy—as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid
judicial navigator." Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .").
7. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
8. An actual conviction for a second offense would warrant a sentence of twenty years,
but it is unlikely a prosecutor would seek such a conviction when revocation offers the option of
lifetime incarceration. The benefit of obtaining an actual conviction, however, is the
elimination of Apprendi problems because there would be no factual findings to be made at a
revocation hearing. The government may "elect to rely solely upon a criminal conviction,
without evidence of the related conduct, to establish the reasonable cause necessary to
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This is a straightforward way to avoid double jeopardy problems, but in
turn, this approach creates an Apprendi problem. If life imprisonment through
revocation of supervised release is a separate and distinct punishment for a
second crime, the defendant has been punished for that crime without according
him a trial with full due process rights. In place of a full trial, the determination
of whether or not the defendant committed a second sexual offense would be
made in a revocation hearing without a jury and without holding the
government to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Some courts have avoided the Apprendi problem by holding that life
imprisonment through revocation is not a second punishment, but is part of the
original sentence for the first offense—an offense that was litigated at a trial
where the defendant was accorded the full panoply of his due process rights.9
But the price for solving the Apprendi problem in this manner is a resurrection
of the double jeopardy problem. If the initial conviction justified both the
original imprisonment for ten years and the potential for life imprisonment
following revocation, has the defendant not been sentenced to two terms of
incarceration? Shockley has no qualms about asserting that "supervised release
defendants are subject to two punishments for one offense. This is in clear
contradiction of the Court’s mandate that the Double Jeopardy Clause
‘protection applies both to successive punishments and to successive
prosecutions for the same criminal offense.’"10
However, it is not as "clear" to me as it is to Shockley that there has been a
violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. There are instances when
a single conviction may warrant multiple forms of punishment. For example, it
is not a violation of double jeopardy when a court imposes both incarceration
and a fine for one conviction. Not only is this not a violation of double
jeopardy, but this familiar form of multiple punishment does not violate
revocation, the ‘bare fact’ of such conviction clearly becomes the basis for the revocation
order." Resio v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 892, 895 (Va. Ct. App. 1999). This, however, is a
one-way street in the government’s favor. An acquittal of the second offense does not bar
subsequent revocation. See, e.g., Marshall v. Commonwealth, 116 S.E.2d 270, 274 (Va. 1960)
(concluding that defendant’s conduct, as proved in the trial in which a jury acquitted the
defendant, may be used to support a revocation). At least in theory, the judge at the revocation
hearing could make factual findings contrary to the prior findings of a jury that acquitted the
defendant of the second offense. This would seem to create an Apprendi problem taken to the
nth power.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing a
sentence as having "distinct aspects," including "the incarcerative term imposed for the crime of
conviction . . . and the supervised release term applicable thereto"); Shockley, supra note 2, at
373–75 (discussing a number of similar holdings).
10. Shockley, supra note 2, at 382 (emphasis added and omitted) (quoting United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993)).
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Apprendi even though the necessity to pay the fine may hinge on resolution of
additional future facts. For example, the government may collect fines only if
the defendant is financially able to pay—debtors’ prison is a thing of the past.
Whether a defendant is incapable of paying the fines or simply refusing to
pay—in which case the defendant may be punished once again for contempt of
court—is a factual determination that will be made sometime after the initial
conviction, and at a hearing where the defendant will not be accorded his full
due process trial rights. At least to date, I am unaware of any successful double
jeopardy or Apprendi challenges to this traditional coupling of incarceration
and fines for a single offense.
Of course, imprisonment and a financial fine involve two distinct forms of
punishment, whereas a court seems to double-up on a single form of
punishment when it imposes both a ten-year sentence for the initial conviction
and a life sentence if and when supervised release is subsequently revoked. But
even in this situation, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not contain a per se
prohibition of all multiple punishments. The prohibition against multiple
punishments is merely a rule of statutory construction, and the Supreme Court
has explained that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally
permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."11 Missouri v. Hunter12
subsequently cautioned that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require courts
to negate clearly expressed legislative intent to impose multiple punishments.13
Thus, with respect to sentencing, double jeopardy analysis turns on
whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to impose multiple punishments
on repeat sex offenders. The operative word here is "clearly." I have
questioned whether Shockley clearly demonstrated a violation of double
jeopardy, but I also question whether Congress clearly has placed its
punishment scheme beyond the coverage of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Looking only at the statutory language itself, Congress seems to have
expressed conflicting intents. A maximum punishment of ten years for a first
offense and twenty years for a second offense seems to express the
congressional view of the appropriate levels of punishment for repeat offenders.
11. Albernaz v. U.S., 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981).
12. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
13. Id. at 366 ("With respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater
punishment than the legislature intended."). The only constitutional limitation on the
legislature’s clear intent to inflict excessive punishment is the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (emphasis added)).
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But the PROTECT Act14 authorizes, and the Sentencing Guidelines
encourage,15 supervised release for life, thus subjecting repeat offenders to life
imprisonment when that release is revoked.
At least on the surface, these congressional enactments lack the clarity of a
unifying intent, and in fact appear contradictory. But I have not researched the
legislative history of these statutes. Those who wish to pursue this issue must
take up the task of examining legislative history and either refuting or
substantiating Shockley’s claim that "by allowing a steeper punishment for a
second offense via the revocation process than that intended by Congress, the
system undermines legislative intent."16
III. The Wisdom of Current Policy
While the constitutionality of the current laws remains in doubt, there is
less doubt surrounding Shockley’s attack on the wisdom of what Congress and
the courts have wrought. Putting aside constitutional considerations, he
proposes three possible improvements to the current system.
A. Solution 1
The current approach relies on both a carrot and a stick. The carrot is that
sexual offenders often suffer from psychological disorders not easily cured,
therefore lengthy periods of supervised release offer a better chance for
rehabilitation and a successful transition from prison to liberty. The stick is the
threat of reincarceration for life when the terms of supervised release are
violated by a second sexual offense. Solution 1 concludes that the punishment
stick is too severe. Shockley proposes that life imprisonment be replaced by a
maximum punishment of twenty-five years for repeat offenders: twenty years
upon conviction of a second sexual offense and five years upon revocation of
supervised release previously imposed for the first sexual offense.17

14. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
15. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.2(b) (2009) ("If the instant offense of
conviction is a sex offense . . . the statutory maximum term of supervised release is
recommended." (emphasis added)).
16. Shockley, supra note 2, at 384.
17. Id. at 389–90.
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He concedes that this solution solves none of the double jeopardy or
Apprendi problems, but at least violations of the defendants’ constitutional
rights would be mitigated by a lesser term of imprisonment. The downside to
this pragmatic solution is that the government appears to be saying that it may
continue to violate constitutional doctrines so long as it reduces the actual
incarceration time of those whose rights have been violated. The other
downside is that a solution whose essence is a plea to lessen punishment of
repeat sex offenders is unlikely to generate much public or political support.18
B. Solution 2
Solution 2 advocates discarding the supervised release regime and
returning to a parole scheme in the federal criminal justice system.19 The main
difference from the current system would be structural. "Whereas supervised
release ‘tacks on’ a supervision period to be served once the full sentence has
been completed, the parole system ‘carves out’ a period of supervision from the
length of the original sentence."20
As the Fifth Circuit noted, this approach might pass constitutional muster
because "probation is imposed instead of imprisonment, while supervised
release is imposed after imprisonment."21 In other words, only supervised
release, not parole, adds a second punishment beyond the statutory maximum
punishment for an offense. Solution 2, however, may unduly exalt form over
substance because, regardless of whether the repeat offender faces revocation of
parole or revocation of supervised release, he may wind up with very
substantial periods of incarceration. In fact, Solution 2 transfers a large portion
of a defendant’s sentence from supervised release (with a threat of revocation)
to additional incarceration before the defendant becomes eligible for parole.
Increasing the time of initial incarceration heightens the monitoring of the
offender, but it weakens the prime goal of supervised release—to aid offenders
in their transition from prison to liberty. Shockley himself concedes that "a
18. Characterizing Solution 1 as a plea for mercy on sex offenders may be a cheap
political shot on my part. Solution 1 does offer a compromise reconciliation of both
congressional intents: monitoring and oversight to promote successful rehabilitation, coupled
with strong punitive measures for repeat offenders.
19. Federal supervised release replaced the federal parole system in 1987. See GozlonPeretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991) (noting the changes implemented by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.)).
20. Shockley, supra note 2, at 392.
21. United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427 n.13 (5th Cir. 2003).
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constitutional but ineffective scheme [Solution 2] is little better than an
unconstitutional scheme [Solution 1]."22
C. Solution 3
Solution 3 attempts to solve both the constitutional and policy problems
surrounding supervised release. "Under this approach, defendants would be
entitled to the same due process protections—specifically the reasonable doubt
standard and right to a jury trial—at revocation hearings as they are at fullblown prosecutions."23 Such an approach eliminates double jeopardy problems
because revocation and reincarceration could be characterized as a second
punishment for a second offense, not a doubling-up of the punishment for the
initial crime. In turn, Apprendi issues are resolved by according defendants
their full trial rights when determining whether they have committed a second
offense.
The only downside to Solution 3 is the scope of its effect on the criminal
justice system. Make no mistake, this is not a narrow correction for the
constitutional and policy problems created by the current supervised release
program. The fundamental premise of Solution 3 is that no one should be
reincarcerated without affording them the same rights applicable at a full scale
prosecution. This proposal thus constitutes a broadside attack upon all
revocation hearings, whether the issue is revocation of supervised release,
parole, probation, or suspended sentence. Such hearings traditionally have had
a "due process light" approach. Under this approach, the defendant is entitled
to some procedural protections, but is denied the right to trial by jury and the
right to require the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The criminal justice system would be fundamentally altered if defendants were
accorded full trial rights at all post-sentencing hearings that might revoke their
liberty and send them back to prison.
Such a fundamental change might well be a significant improvement, but
the scope of this new and improved punishment system requires consideration
of factors far beyond what Shockley has focused on in his Note. As one of
Shockley’s former professors, I can suggest (but no longer assign) that his next
project be to extend his consideration of revocation hearings to cover all forms
of post-sentence hearings where defendants face a loss of liberty.
None of Shockley’s proposed solutions is perfect, but this does not lessen
the impact of his attack upon the current system. His primary contribution has
22.
23.

Shockley, supra note 2, at 393.
Id. at 394.
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been to force Congress and the courts to reconsider the weaknesses and the
inconsistencies of the current supervised release regime. Hopefully, Congress
and the judiciary will utilize his analysis when formulating improvements to the
current system.

